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Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality in Singapore 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We examine three characteristics (independence, expertise, and overlapping membership) of 
audit committees and their impact on the financial reporting quality for Singapore listed 
companies. The main finding is that financial reporting quality will be higher if audit 
committees have mixed expertise in accounting, finance and/or supervisory. In addition, we 
do not find evidence that incremental independence of audit committees enhance financial 
reporting quality because audit committees already consist of a majority of independent 
directors. Finally we fail to find any impact of overlapping membership on audit and 
remuneration committees on financial reporting quality. Overall, the results have policy 
implications on improving corporate governance effectiveness in terms of financial reporting 
quality. 
 
JEL classification: G34; M41 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Audit Committee; Independence; Expertise; Overlapping 
Membership; Financial Reporting Quality 
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Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality in Singapore 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims to examine the impact of audit committee on financial reporting 
quality in Singapore. Audit committee of corporate board of directors has received 
broad-based support for many years as a key component of effective corporate 
governance. Audit committee’s main duty is overseeing financial reporting process to 
ensure managers reporting their firm performance ethically. Opportunistic reporting of 
firm performance by manipulating financial numbers is detrimental to shareholders’ value 
because shareholders will get false information which may result in higher information 
asymmetry and higher cost of capital. The effectiveness of corporate audit committee in 
overseeing the financial reporting process depends on the independence of audit 
committee members (Klein, 2002), the expertise of audit committee members (Dhaliwal, 
Naiker, & Navissi, 2010) and the overlapping membership on audit and remuneration 
committees (Chandar, Chang, & Zheng, 2012; Liao & Hsu, 2013). 
The composition of audit committee is less stringent in Singapore than other more 
developed economies such as the US. In December 1999, The NYSE and NASDAQ 
modified their requirements for audit committees in listed companies and mandated firms 
to have at least three audit committee members and all members must be independent who 
have no relationship to the company that may interfere with the exercise of their 
independence from management and the company (Klein, 2002). Singapore’s Companies 
Act has a similar mandatory requirement but it only requires the majority of audit 
committee members to be independent. In practice, audit committees in Singapore may 
contain executive directors (including the CEO) and non-independent non-executive (i.e., 
affiliated or grey) directors (Bradbury, Mak, & Tan, 2006). The Singapore Code of 
Corporate Governance in 2001 and subsequent revised versions in 2005 and 2012 require 
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all audit committee members to be non-executive directors but it does not require all of 
them to be independent, although the majority of audit committee members and the 
Chairman must be independent.1 In addition, compliance with the Singapore Code of 
Corporate Governance is not compulsory but listed companies are required to disclose any 
deviation from the Code in their annual reports.2 
Although there are numerous studies in the existing literature on audit committee 
characteristics, to the best of our knowledge, Bradbury et al. (2006) is the only study to 
examine the impact of audit committee members’ independence on financial reporting 
quality in Singapore. However, their data sample period is for the year 2000 which is 
before the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance was first issued in 2001 and it is 
interesting to examine this important issue using a more recent sample. In addition to audit 
committee members’ independence, we contribute to the existing literature by examining 
another two important characteristics of audit committee, i.e., the expertise of audit 
committee members and overlapping membership on audit and remuneration committees, 
which have yet been examined in prior studies involving Singapore-listed companies. 
We hand collect all the three audit committee characteristics data for 423 Singapore 
Exchange (SGX) listed companies in fiscal year 2010, which have financial information 
on COMPUSTAT Global database. We employ the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure 
of accruals quality based on how precisely the current accruals map into past, present and 
future cash flows; and use accruals quality as a proxy for the financial reporting quality of 
Singapore firms. The empirical findings are summarized as follows.  
                                                 
1 Regulators have different requirements or recommendations on the independence of audit committee 
members. Although regulators in the US and the UK require all audit committee members to be 
independent, regulators in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Singapore and many other markets require only 
majority of audit committee members to be independent. Klein (2002) finds that there is no significant 
difference in financial reporting quality for audit committees with all independent directors compared to 
those with a majority only of independent directors. 
2 The Singapore Code is available at http://www.mas.gov.sg/. 
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First, we do not find that audit committee members’ incremental independence leads 
to higher financial reporting quality. Our explanation is that all audit committees of our 
sample firms consist of at least a majority of independent directors and marginal 
improvement in the audit committee independence will not result in higher financial 
reporting quality. This result is also consistent with Klein (2002) which finds that there is 
no statistical difference in financial reporting quality for audit committees with all 
independent directors compared with those with a majority only of independent directors. 
It may also indicate that audit committees with a majority of independent directors should 
be independent enough to monitor companies’ financial reporting process. Hence it might 
be unnecessary to mandate all audit committee members to be independent as what is 
required in the US and the UK currently. 
Second, we find that financial reporting quality increases with the presence of 
accounting experts in audit committee, which highlights the important role that expertise 
plays in board monitoring and governance. In addition, we further decompose audit 
committee with accounting experts into several other components: those with accounting 
experts only; those with accounting and finance experts only; those with accounting and 
supervisory experts only; and those with all the three expertise. The findings reveal that 
financial reporting quality is not affected if audit committees are made up of only 
accounting experts. Instead, financial reporting quality is only improved when the audit 
committees also consist of members that possess other skill-set in terms of finance or 
supervisory expertise. Therefore, our empirical results lend further credence to the call for 
diversity of expertise in audit committees and extend that of Dhaliwal et al. (2010) for the 
US firms, who find that financial reporting quality is positively associated with the 
presence of accounting and finance (but not supervisory) experts in audit committee. We 
interpret our findings as suggesting that supervisory expertise gained through experience 
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in supervising corporate operations is a good complement to the domain-specific expertise 
in accounting and finance. This is supportive of Goh (2009), who finds that the proportion 
of audit committee members with supervisory expertise, rather than accounting expertise, 
is positively associated with firms’ timeliness in the remediation of internal control 
weaknesses in the US firms. 
Third, we do not find that accounting experts with overlapping membership on audit 
and remuneration committees matters for financial reporting quality. The theory by Laux 
and Laux (2009) proposes that audit committee members sitting on remuneration 
committee shall know more on management’s pay-for-performance compensation package 
and hence better able to identify management’s incentives to manipulate financial 
reporting. Our result indicates that the overlapping membership does not contribute to the 
monitoring of financial reporting quality. There might be a dilution of efforts by 
overlapping membership directors and hence there is no improvement in monitoring 
financial reporting process. In fact Liao and Tsu (2013) find that firms with overlapping 
membership have lower financial reporting quality. 
Overall, the results from this study shed further light on the role that audit committee 
plays in listed companies and offer some policy implications to regulators in Singapore 
and other economies. First, whether audit committees should be fully independent or 
majority independent is still debatable. Unlike in the US whereby the regulator mandates 
that all audit committee members to be independent, the Singapore Code of Corporate 
Governance does not have such stringent requirement. The bottom line is that the majority 
of audit committee, including the Chairman of audit committee, must be independent. 
Second, our results suggest that mixed expertise with accounting, finance and/or 
supervisory is better than a single expertise in the audit committee. One important ethical 
implication is that regulators may consider making similar recommendations to public 
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companies to further enhance the effectiveness of audit committees in Singapore and other 
economies. Having mixed expertise in audit committees helps to mitigate the incidence of 
fraudulent financial reporting, which in turn decreases the likelihood of firms receiving 
unclean opinion from external auditors such as qualified opinion, no opinion, adverse 
opinion or unqualified opinion with explanatory language. This implies that audit 
committees are performing their monitoring role of the financial reporting process more 
effectively, which subsequently leads to improved firm performance. 
Finally, we do not find any impact of the overlapping membership on audit and 
remuneration committees on financial reporting quality. However, we believe there is 
important knowledge transmission between sub-committees and the impact on the 
effectiveness of board monitoring is still unknown. We leave this issue for future research.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a 
literature review on the studies on the effectiveness of audit committees and develop the 
hypotheses. We then outline the research design and provide the sample collection 
procedures and descriptive statistics of the main variables. We finally present the 
empirical results, followed by conclusions of our research findings. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, we review the literature and develop four hypotheses on the impact of 
audit committee independence, expertise of audit committee members and overlapping 
membership on audit committee and remuneration committee on financial reporting 
quality. 
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Audit Committee Independence and Financial Reporting Quality 
 The primary duty of audit committee is to oversee the firm’s financial reporting 
process, including the integrity of financial statements, the effectiveness of internal 
controls and the monitoring of both internal and external auditors. It enhances the board of 
directors (principal)'s capacity to act as a monitor of management (agent) by providing 
more detailed knowledge and understanding of financial statements of the company 
(Pincus, Rusbarsky, & Wong, 1989). The audit committee is also expected to play a role 
as arbiter between management and external auditors since these two parties may have 
legitimate differences of opinion in how to best apply accounting standards (Klein, 2002). 
Thus, the existence and independence of audit committee members may help them to 
balance divergent views of management and external auditors to produce ultimately a 
higher quality financial report. 
 This stream of research is pioneered by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991), who find that 
the existence of audit committee is more likely to prevent overstatement accounting errors. 
They examine the incidence of accounting errors revealed by prior period adjustments for 
41 US listed firms and find that overstatements are less likely among firms that have audit 
committees. Similarly, Dechow et al. (1996) study US firms that were subject to 
accounting enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for 
alleged violations of accounting standards and report that firms manipulating earnings are 
less likely to have an audit committee. However, Beasley (1996) fails to find any 
significant association between the presence of audit committees and the likelihood of 
financial fraud by examining 75 US firms which were involved in financial fraud. His 
result was reasonable because audit committees were formed voluntarily in the early years 
and there was considerable anecdotal evidence that many, if not most, audit committees 
fell short of doing what are generally perceived as their fiduciary duties. 
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 Klein (2002) is probably the first study that systematically examines the impact of 
audit committee independence on financial reporting quality. She hand-collected 692 
firm-year observations with the data of composition of board from S&P 500 firms during 
the period 1992-1993. A negative relation is found between audit committee independence 
and abnormal accruals (which is a common measure of financial reporting quality). 
Carcello and Neal (2003) examine disclosure practice of a sample of 138 publicly held 
manufacturing companies experiencing financial distress during 1994 in the US. They find 
that there is a significant negative relation between the percentage of independent directors 
on audit committee and the optimism of the going-concern discussion in both the notes 
and the Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A). Using hand-collected board data 
from 139 firms in Singapore and 113 firms in Malaysia, Bradbury et al. (2006) find that 
the relation between audit committee independence and higher financial reporting quality 
exists only when the abnormal accruals are income increasing. 
 Although empirical results suggest that audit committee independence plays an 
important role in reporting higher quality financial information and some countries such as 
the US and the UK require all audit committee members to be independent, Singapore and 
many other countries such as Australia and China have been only requiring the majority of 
audit committee members to be independent. Before the Singapore Code of Corporate 
Governance was first issued in 2001, Singapore Companies Act required firms to appoint 
an audit committee of at least three members, a majority of whom are independent 
directors. As reported by Bradbury et al (2006), some of the audit committee members in 
2000 were executive directors such as CEOs. In 2001, the Code further requires that all 
audit committee members must be non-executive and the majority including the Chairman 
should be independent. However, compliance with the Code is not mandatory and listed 
companies are required under the Singapore Exchange Listing Rules to disclose their 
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corporate governance practices and give explanations for deviations from the Code in their 
annual reports.3 
 In sum, whether the audit committee independence in Singapore will be positively 
related to financial reporting quality or not is still an empirical question. We formally 
present the hypothesis in an alternative format as follows. 
 
H1. The audit committee members’ independence is positively associated with financial 
reporting quality. 
 
Expertise of Audit Committee Members and Financial Reporting Quality 
 The financial expertise of audit committee members has gained the attention of 
regulators around the world in recent years. For example, in the US, Section 407 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the SEC to adopt rules mandating audit committee 
of public firms include at least one member who is a financial expert or disclose reasons 
for not adopting this requirement. The UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 issued by 
Financial Reporting Council also suggests that there be at least one member of audit 
committee who has recent and relevant financial experience. Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations with 2010 Amendments issued by Australian Securities 
Exchange recommends Australian public firms establish audit committees with members 
who have relevant technical expertise. It also clarifies that the committee should have at 
least one member with relevant qualifications and experience in financial or accounting 
matters. The Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 2012 issued by the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore and the Singapore Exchange puts more emphasis on financial 
expertise and it recommends public firms in Singapore have at least two members, 
                                                 
3 We find no deviations in our sample firms, i.e., all audit committee members are non-executive directors 
and the majority of them are independent. 
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including audit committee Chairman, to have recent and relevant accounting or related 
financial management expertise or experience. It infers that Singapore encourages 
companies to have mixed expertise. Although the definition of financial expertise varies 
from code to code, accounting-related expertise or experience is commonly accepted as 
the most important dimension of financial expertise. 
 As the primary duty of audit committee is to oversee the financial process of the 
company, it is reasonable to believe that audit committee members with financial expertise 
(especially accounting expertise) have more effective means to monitor management’s 
financial reporting practices to produce higher quality financial reporting. Findings from 
the existing academic studies generally support the prediction and find that the presence of 
audit committee members with financial expertise is positively associated with financial 
reporting quality. For example, Carcello et al. (2006) find that independent audit 
committee members with accounting expertise and certain types of non-accounting 
financial expertise are most effective in mitigating earnings management. Using internal 
control weakness as a measure of financial reporting quality, Zhang et al. (2007) find that 
firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness if their audit 
committees have less accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial 
expertise. However, another two recent studies find contradicting results on the role of 
accounting expertise and non-accounting expertise. Examining the composition of audit 
committees for a sample of S&P 500 firms, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) find that 
only accounting financial expertise, rather than non-accounting financial expertise, is 
positively associated with conservatism, a fundamental property of financial statements. 
On the other hand, Goh (2009) finds that only non-accounting financial expertise, rather 
than accounting financial expertise, is positively associated with firms’ timeliness in the 
remediation of material weakness in internal control. 
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 In sum, the impact of accounting expertise on financial reporting quality is still an 
open question. We express the hypothesis in alternative format as follows. 
 
H2. The audit committee members’ accounting expertise is positively associated with 
financial reporting quality. 
 
 Although Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) fail to find any significant impact of 
non-accounting financial expertise on financial reporting quality,4 existing theoretical and 
empirical research suggest that a mix of accounting and non-accounting expertise may 
enhance audit committee’s ability to monitor financial reporting process. Resource 
dependence theory argues that directors extract human capital resources from other 
directors to improve firm performance (Pfeffer, 1972). Hence, both Cohen et al. (2008) 
and Hillman et al. (2000) argue that audit committee can benefit from a mix of accounting 
and non-accounting expertise, such as finance expertise and management/supervisory 
expertise. Using a sample of 770 firms during the period of 2004-2006, Dhaliwal et al. 
(2010) find that finance experts such as investment bankers and financial analysts can 
complement accounting experts to promote higher financial reporting quality as measured 
by accruals quality. They also find that supervisory experts such as CEOs or company 
presidents are unable to help accounting and finance experts to enhance financial reporting 
quality, which appears to contradict the findings in Goh (2009). 
 Whether or not non-accounting experts such as finance experts and supervisory 
experts will enhance financial reporting quality in Singapore is still an empirical question. 
We state the hypothesis in alternative format as follows. 
 
                                                 
4 On the other hand, Goh (2009) fail to find any significant association between accounting financial 
expertise and the timeliness of remediation of internal control weaknesses. 
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H3. The audit committee members’ mixed expertise with accounting, finance and 
supervisory experts is positively associated with financial reporting quality. 
 
Overlapping Memberships in the Audit and Remuneration Committees 
 A recent theoretical study by Laux and Laux (2009) argue that the presence of 
remuneration committee will increase the use of pay-for-performance CEO compensation 
such as stock-based payments in order to better incentivize the management. The usage of 
pay-for-performance compensation could motivate CEOs to influence the financial 
reporting process in order to report better performance for higher compensation. The 
higher monitoring cost associated with pay-for-performance compensation will be borne 
by the audit committee. Individuals that sit in both audit committee and remuneration 
committee may curb the increase of pay-for-performance, which results in lower 
monitoring cost and higher financial reporting quality. The overlapping membership 
enables them to understand management’s incentive better because they know more about 
the pay-performance compensation contract, and hence results in higher financial 
reporting quality as well. 
Recent empirical studies have found mixed evidence on the theory of Laux and Laux 
(2009). Chang et al. (2011), Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) and Zheng and Cullinan (2010) 
find that companies with less overlap among audit and remuneration committees are more 
likely to employ incentive executive compensation such as stock options. Chandar et al. 
(2012) examine the impact of overlapping membership on financial reporting quality, 
using a sample of non-financial S&P 500 firms representing 1,032 firm years over the 
period 2003-2005. They find that firms with overlapping audit and remuneration 
committees have higher financial reporting quality which is measured by accruals quality. 
On the contrary, using 4,572 firm-year observations in the US during fiscal years 
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2004–2008, Liao and Hsu (2013) find that US firms with overlapping membership have 
poorer financial reporting quality and weaker CEO pay-performance sensitivity.  
Whether overlapping membership in the audit and remuneration committees in 
Singapore firms will have any positive impact on financial reporting quality is still an 
open question. We state the hypothesis in an alternative below. 
 
H4. Firms with overlapping membership on the audit and remuneration committees are 
more likely to have higher financial reporting quality. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we describe the research methodologies that are designed to test the 
main hypotheses that we have developed in the previous section. 
 
Dependent Variable: Financial Reporting Quality 
 Consistent with numerous recent studies (e.g., Francis et al., 2005; Bharath et al., 
2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2010), we employ accruals quality as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality. Audit committee members’ fiduciary duties are to provide effective monitoring of 
financial reporting process of the company and ensure the management provides high 
quality financial reporting to reflect true firm performance. In this way, any incidence of 
unethical performance manipulation by managers will be detected early. Managers 
manipulate firm performance mainly through manipulation of accounting numbers (i.e., 
accruals), hence we employ accruals quality in our study as primary measure of financial 
reporting quality. There is no universally accepted measure for accruals quality and we 
adopt the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The basic Dechow and Dichev model 
assumes that accruals quality depends on how precisely the current accruals map into past, 
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present and future cash flows. High precision on the mapping of current accruals and cash 
flows indicate high financial reporting quality. The model is presented as follows: 
ΔWCt = a0 + a1CFOt-1 + a2CFOt + a3CFOt+1 + Industry + εt                    (1) 
where 
ΔWCt = change in working capital accruals of firm i (we omit the subscript i for 
model simplicity) in year t, measured as the increase in accounts receivable 
plus the increase in inventory plus the decrease in accounts payable and 
accrued liabilities plus decrease in taxes accrued plus the increase 
(decrease) in other assets (liabilities), scaled by average assets; 
CFOt = cash flow from operations in year t scaled by average assets; 
Industry = industry dummies. 
   
Following the argument by Bradbury et al. (2006), due to the relatively small number 
of firms within each industry in Singapore and the short time period, we estimate equation 
(1) by using a pooled ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression methodology which 
controls for effect of industries (using the industry classification from Fama and French 
(1997)) instead of estimating industry-specific or firm-specific regressions. Dhaliwal et al. 
(2010) estimate firm-specific regressions for their US sample, however, others have 
argued that industry specific regressions are more appropriate for estimating accruals 
quality (see the survey by Dechow et al. (2010)). For example, Subramanyam (1996) 
reports that cross-sectional model generates a larger sample and increases the precision of 
the estimates. We also require sample firms to have at least five consecutive years’ of 
non-missing data on the control variables to estimate the pooled sample regression. Our 
measure of accruals quality (FRQ) is based on the standard deviation of residuals from the 
pooled sample. We multiply the standard deviation by (-1) to calculate FRQ. Therefore, a 
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higher value of FRQ indicates higher accruals quality and higher financial reporting 
quality.  
 
Independent Variables: Characteristics of Audit Committee 
Panel B of Appendix 1 defines our independent variables about the characteristics of 
audit committee. We adopt the definition of independent director as recommended by the 
Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 2012 (Guideline 2.3), whereby an independent 
director is “one who has no relationship with the company, its related corporations, its 
major shareholders (those who owns a 10% or more stake in the company), or its officers 
that could interfere, or be reasonably perceived to interfere, with the exercise of the 
director’s independent business judgement with a view to the best interests of the 
company.” The Code also requires the board of directors of a company to identify in its 
annual report each director that it considers to be independent. It is the sole responsibility 
of the board of directors to determine “whether the director is independent in character and 
judgement and whether there are relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, 
or could appear to affect, the director’s judgement.” We hand-collected the independence 
status of audit committee members from the annual reports as disclosed by companies and 
we have no information to judge whether audit committee members are truly independent 
or not. This limitation of data applies to all research which requires independence status of 
corporate directors. 
Following Klein (2002), we use two definitions of audit committee members’ 
independence. The basic independence measure is the percentage of independent directors 
on audit committees (AC_IND). The other measure is a dichotomous variable which take a 
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value of 1 if all (100% rule) audit committee members are independent from management 
(AC_IND_100).5 
Financial expertise is another important characteristic of audit committees. The 
Singapore Code of Corporate Governance (Guideline 12.2) recommends that at least two 
audit committee members, including the Chairman of audit committee, have recent and 
relevant accounting or related financial management expertise or experience. Although 
financial expertise is required by the Code, there is a call for mixed expertise in the 
Guidebook for Audit Committees in Singapore jointly issued by Accounting and 
Corporate Regulatory Authority, Monetary Authority of Singapore and Singapore 
Exchange.6 The Guidebook interprets financial expertise as having some or all of the 
following abilities or experience: understand and assess the quality of financial reporting 
process including internal controls (mainly accounting expertise); understand risk factors 
relevant to the company’s operations including those relating to treasury operations, 
investment activities and financing activities (mainly finance expertise) and experience 
gained through executive responsibility for a sizeable business including having or having 
had responsibility for the finance function, such as being or having been a CEO, CFO or 
other senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities (mainly supervisory 
expertise). The Guidebook also recommends that “the combination of skills within the AC 
should reflect broad experience and knowledge relevant in assisting the AC in discharging 
its responsibilities.” 
Accordingly, in our study we classify financial expertise into accounting expertise, 
finance expertise and supervisory expertise. The classification system of audit committee 
members’ financial expertise closely follows that which has been widely used in the 
                                                 
5 We do not use the 51% rule, i.e. whether or not more than half audit committee members are independent, 
in the study because almost all (98%) of our sample firms satisfy the 51% rule and the rest (2%) of our 
sample firms have exactly 50% independent audit committee members. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
are reported in Table 2. 
6 The Guidebook is available at https://www.acra.gov.sg/Publications/Guides/. 
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existing literature (such as DeFond et al., 2005; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; and 
Dhaliwal et al., 2010). We first classify audit committee members to two different groups: 
accounting financial experts and non-accounting financial experts. Accounting financial 
experts (ACCT) are classified as audit committee members who are certified public 
accountants (CPAs) or with prior work experience as chief financial officers (CFO), vice 
president of finance, financial controllers, or any other major accounting positions. 
Non-accounting financial experts comprise of finance and supervisory experts. Finance 
experts (FINA) are classified as audit committee members with prior work experience as 
investment bankers, chief investment officers, financial analysts, or any other corporate 
finance role. Finally, supervisory experts (SUPER) are the second-type of non-accounting 
financial experts and they are classified as audit committee members with prior work 
experience in supervisory roles such as chief executive officers (CEO) or company 
presidents. Essentially, all the three expertise examined in this study refer to different 
types of financial expertise recommended in the Singapore Code of Corporate 
Governance.7 
The basic measure of overlapping membership on audit and remuneration committees 
is a dichotomous variable (OVERLAP) which takes a value of 1 if at least one audit 
committee member sits on the remuneration committee and 0 otherwise. We also control 
for the overlapping member’s independence and accounting expertise because 
independent accounting experts are more experienced in performance measurement which 
enables them to better write top management’s compensation contract and monitor 
financial reporting process. We define a dichotomous variable (OVERLAP_ACCT) which 
                                                 
7 Moreover, we allow an audit committee member to have more than one expertise, if they have the relevant 
experience and qualifications. For example, if an individual audit committee member is a CPA and at the 
same time is a CEO of another company, we will classify him to be both an accounting and supervisory 
expert. We believe that our measures of expertise capture the full mix of expertise of audit committee 
members in Singapore. 
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takes a value of 1 if there is at least one independent accounting expert sitting on both the 
audit and remuneration committees. 
 
Control Variables 
 Panel C of Appendix 1 defines the control variables used in this study which may 
affect financial reporting quality according to existing literature. We control for other 
characteristics of audit committees: the number of audit committee members (AC_SIZE), 
the proportion of total shares held by all audit committee members (AC_SHARE), the 
mean number of boards audit committee members serve on (AC_MULTB), the mean 
tenure of audit committee members (AC_TENURE), and the number of audit committee 
meetings (AC_MEET) held in a financial year. In addition to the attributes of audit 
committee members, we also control for the attributes of corporate boards: the number of 
non-audit committee directors sitting on the board (BD_SIZE), the proportion of total 
outstanding shares held by the non-audit committee directors (BD_SHARE), and the 
CEO-board chairman duality (DUALITY). The quality of external auditors is measured by 
whether or not the firm is audited by one of the Big Four accounting firms (BIG4).8 Other 
firm characteristics, such as whether or not the firm is a family firm (FAMILY), 
government-linked firm (GLC), or Singapore-listed Chinese firms (SCHIPS), are also 
controlled in the regressions.  
Finally, we also control for all the innate factors identified by Francis et al. (2004) and 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) which find that accruals quality is: (a) related to the standard 
deviation of cash flow from operations (STDCFO), the frequency of reporting negative 
earnings (NEGEARN), the standard deviation of sales revenue (STDSALES), the log of the 
operating cycle (OPCYCLE), and the ratio of total intangibles to total sales (INTSALES) 
                                                 
8 The Big Four accounting firms are Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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and (b) positively related to the log of total assets (ASSETS), the absence of reported 
intangibles (INTDUM), and the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to average total 
assets (PPE). Appendix 1 provides the detailed definition of all the variables used in the 
study. 
 
Research Design 
 We employ cross-sectional regression analysis to test the impact of audit committee 
characteristics on financial reporting quality in Singapore. The basic model is presented in 
equation (2) as follows: 
0 * *i k i j i iFRQ IndependentVariables ControlVariables        .        (2) 
Note that larger FRQ values indicate higher accruals quality and financial reporting 
quality, hence significant positive coefficient estimates of independent variables imply 
positive impact of the underlying factor on financial reporting quality. 
 We first introduce audit committee independence measures into the regression model, 
followed by measures of audit committee members’ expertise and overlapping 
membership on audit and remuneration committee, to test the impact of each of the three 
audit committee characteristics on the financial reporting quality and examine which 
characteristic exert a dominant role in monitoring the financial reporting process. 
 
SAMPLE AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
Table 1 outlines the sample selection procedure. Our initial sample comprises all the 
782 firms listed on Singapore Exchange as of 31 December 2010. We manage to extract 
539 non-financial firms with accounting data in fiscal year 2010 from the COMPUSTAT 
Global database. We exclude 101 firms without at least 5 years of consecutive financial 
data available for computing accruals quality for the fiscal year 2010 and another 15 firms 
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with missing values on control variables for the subsequent regression analyses. We then 
manually collect the data on board of directors and audit committees for the remaining 
423 non-financial companies from their respective annual reports for the fiscal year 2010. 
Our final sample consists of 423 firms with complete financial data as well as board and 
audit committee characteristics data for the fiscal year 2010, which is much larger than the 
139 sample firms used in Bradbury et al. (2006). 
  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the accruals quality (FRQ), audit 
committee and board characteristics, and other relevant control variables. For the fiscal 
year 2010, Singapore firms have a mean FRQ value of -0.107 (median = -0.089), with a 
minimum value of -0.419 and a maximum value of -0.009. The average proportion of 
independent directors in audit committees (AC_IND) is about 87 percent, with a minimum 
value of 50 percent (i.e., all sample firms have at least half of independent audit 
committee members). Unreported data indicate that 98 percent of sample firms have a 
majority (i.e., more than half) of independent directors sitting on audit committees. 
Moreover, 59 percent of audit committees are made up of entirely independent directors 
(AC_IND_100). The mean value of independent director proportion (AC_IND) for the 
year 2010 is relatively higher compared to 70 percent for the year 2000 as compiled by 
Bradbury et al. (2006), indicating that the independence of audit committees in Singapore 
has been improved from 2000 to 2010. However, the proportion of independent director in 
audit committees is relatively lower compared to 93% for the period 2004-2006 for 770 
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US firms in Dhaliwal et al. (2010), indicating that Singapore firms are still behind their 
counterparts in the US in terms of audit committee independence.9  
In terms of expertise in audit committees, we observe that on average, 80, 64, and 97 
percent of audit committees are represented by at least one director who is an accounting 
expert (ACCT), finance expert (FINA), and supervisory expert (SUPER), respectively. The 
mean number of audit committee members (AC_SIZE) is 3.24 (median = 3), with a 
minimum value of 2 and a maximum value of 6. The size of audit committees in 
Singapore is relatively smaller compared to the mean of 3.72 for US firms in Dhaliwal et 
al. (2010). In addition, the average values for AC_SHARE, AC_MULTB, AC_TENURE, 
and AC_MEET are 0.9 percent, 1.3 board, 3.0 years, and 3.8 meetings (with median values 
of 0 percent, 1.0 board, 1.6 years, and 3 meetings), respectively. It is interesting to note 
that Singapore audit committee members hold more shares in listed companies than their 
counterparts in the US (0.9 percent versus 0.2 percent as reported in Dahliwal et al. 2010). 
However, Singapore audit committee members are less busy (1.3 board versus 2.7 boards), 
with shorter tenure (3.0 years versus 8.0 years) and meet less frequently (3.8 meetings 
versus 9.0 meetings). The corresponding mean values for BD_IND and BD_SHARE are 10 
and 6 percent (with median values of 0 and 5 percent), respectively. Compared to the US 
firms reported in Dhaliwal et al. (2010), Singapore boards excluding audit committee 
members are less independent (10 percent versus 50 percent) and Singapore board 
members excluding audit committee members have higher ownership in their listed 
companies (6.4 percent versus 1.4 percent). A relatively high 34 percent of Singapore 
firms have the same person serving as the Chairman as well as CEO but it is still relatively 
lower compared to 51% in the US About 65 percent of Singapore companies are audited 
by the Big Four accounting firms, whereas in the US the figure is relatively higher at 
                                                 
9 It is anticipated because Singapore regulator does not require all audit committee members to be 
independent. 
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94.2% for the 770 firms reported in Dhaliwal et al. (2010). About 7 percent of Singapore 
firms received unclean auditor’s opinion including qualified opinion, no opinion, adverse 
opinion or unqualified opinion with explanatory language. Family firms make up about 36 
percent of the sample, while government-linked and Singapore-listed Chinese firms make 
up about 4 and 10 percent of the sample firms, respectively. 
In terms of the firm-specific financial data, the mean values for ASSETS, STDCFO, 
STDSALE, OPCYCLE, INTSALES, and PPE are 5.3, 0.09, 0.25, 5.03, 0.09, and 0.26 (with 
median values of 5.0, 0.07, 0.16, 0.20, 5.04, 0.01, and 0.22) respectively. Compared to the 
770 US firms in Dahliwal et al. (2010), Singapore firms are much smaller but with higher 
variations in cash flows and sale. The mean values for NEGEARN and INTDUM are 0.20 
and 0.25, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
  
We also report the Pearson’s correlation coefficients in Table 3. We observe that audit 
committee expertise variables (ACCT, FINA, and SUPER) are negatively but not 
significantly correlated with FRQ; which are contrary to our predictions. Nevertheless, 
formal tests will be conducted using multivariate regression analysis in the next section. In 
addition, we examine the variance inflation factor (VIF) of each independent variable in 
the estimation of the main regression model and find that the VIFs of all the independent 
variables are small (<3) and the mean VIF is only 1.39 which is much lower than the 
common rule of 10 as a sign of severe or serious multicollinearity. This indicates that none 
of the correlations are large enough to raise concern related to multicollinearity. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Audit Committee Independence and Financial Reporting Quality 
 We use the two alternative measures of audit committee independence (AC_IND and 
AC_IND_100) as independent variables and estimate equation (2) using OLS. The control 
variables are: AC_SIZE, AC_SHARE, AC_MULTB, AC_TENURE, AC_MEET, BD_IND, 
BD_SHARE, DUALITY, BIG4, FAMILY, GLC, SCHIPS, ASSETS, STDCFO, STDSALE, 
NEGEARN, OPCYCLE, INTSALES, INTDUM, and PPE. The definitions of the two 
alternative independent variables and control variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
The regression results are presented in Models (1) to (2) of Table 4. The first 
hypothesis (H1) predicts that independent audit committee members should enhance the 
financial reporting quality, i.e., the estimated coefficient on the audit committee 
independence measure should be positive. However, the findings from both Model (1) and 
Model (2) do not support H1. For example, the estimated coefficient of AC_IND is 
negative but insignificant, indicating that the proportion of independent audit committee 
members is not statistically associated with financial reporting quality. 
Although we fail to find any statistical impact of audit committee independence on 
financial reporting quality, we do not claim that audit committee member’s independence 
will not enhance financial reporting quality in Singapore. We believe the insignificance of 
our results is due to the fact that almost all of our sample firms (98%) have a majority of 
independent audit committee members. If audit committees with a majority of 
independent directors are independent enough to monitor financial reporting process, we 
should not observe any incremental impact on financial reporting quality even if audit 
committees consist of more independent directors. Our result is consistent with Klein 
(2002) which finds that there is no significant difference in financial reporting quality for 
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audit committees with all independent directors compared with those with a majority only 
of independent directors. 
We also find that AC_SIZE is negatively associated with FRQ, which suggests that 
increasing the size of audit committee may be detrimental to financial reporting quality. In 
terms of the other firm-specific control variables; we find that while STDCFO, STDSALE, 
NEGEARN and OPCYCLE are also negatively related to FRQ, INTSALES, INTDUM and 
PPE are positively related to FRQ. These findings are largely consistent with the earlier 
findings by Dechow and Dichev (2002), Francis et al. (2004), and Dhaliwal et al. (2010). 
  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Audit Committee Expertise and Financial Reporting Quality 
Besides the main audit committee members’ independence measure (AC_IND), we 
include the three types of audit committee members’ expertise measures (ACCT, FINA, 
and SUPER) in the basic equation (2) using OLS. The regression results are presented in 
Table 5. 
Models (1) to (3) of Table 5 show the results of regressing FRQ on each expertise and 
other control variables. The second hypothesis (H2) predicts that audit committee 
members’ accounting expertise should be positively associated with financial reporting 
quality, i.e., the estimated coefficient on ACCT should be positive. The empirical results 
suggest that accounting expertise does matter in enhancing financial reporting quality, 
with the estimated coefficient of ACCT being positive (magnitude = 0.017, p-value = 0.04) 
and statistically significant at least at the 5% level in Model (1). Models (2) and (3) reveal 
that finance expertise (FINA) or supervisory expertise (SUPER) is not related to FRQ 
given that both estimated coefficients are negative and insignificant. 
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Model (4) presents the results when all three types of expertise are included in the 
regression. Out of the 3 coefficients, only the estimated coefficient of ACCT is positive 
and significant with magnitude of 0.016 and p-value of 0.04, relatively similar to that 
obtained in Model (1). The inferences for the other control variables are also unchanged 
both quantitatively and qualitatively, in comparison to that obtained in Table 4. In 
particular, we still find that there is no significant statistical relation between financial 
reporting quality and audit committee independence. 
In general, the results in Table 5 complement that of Dhaliwal et al. (2010) and imply 
that the presence of accounting experts (rather than finance or supervisory experts) in 
audit committee will provide better monitoring of the financial reporting process, which 
subsequently leads to higher financial reporting quality.10 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 To test the impact of mixed expertise of audit committees on financial reporting 
quality (the third hypothesis), we decompose those audit committees with at least one 
accounting expert into 4 groups: those with accounting experts only and without other 
expertise (ACCT_ONLY), those with accounting and finance expertise only but without 
supervisory expertise (ACCT_FINA), those with accounting and supervisory expertise 
only but without finance expertise (ACCT_SUPER), and those with all three types of 
expertise (ALL_EXPERTS). We replace audit committee members’ expertise with the four 
variables as described above and estimate the modified equation (2) using OLS. The 
results are presented in Table 6.  
                                                 
10 As a robustness test, we also include only ACCT and FINA in the estimation of equation (2) and once 
again, we find that only the estimated coefficient of ACCT is positive (magnitude = 0.017) and statistically 
significant at the 5% level (p-value = 0.04). 
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 Interestingly, we find that audit committees containing members with accounting 
experts only do not seem to influence financial reporting quality as the estimated 
coefficient of ACCT_ONLY is positive but insignificant. However, the estimated 
coefficients of the other three variables (ACCT_FINA, ACCT_SUPER, and 
ALL_EXPERTS) are all positive and marginally significant at least at the 10% significance 
level. These results are consistent with the third hypothesis and lend further credence to 
the importance of having an individual in the audit committee who possess another 
skill-set (in finance or supervisory role) other than accounting in order for financial 
reporting quality to be improved. Therefore, our paper contributes to the existing literature 
by highlighting that having a diversity of expertise is paramount for audit committees in 
Singapore-listed firms to play positive roles in the financial reporting process. Moreover, 
the finding of this paper also identifies the positive input made by audit committee 
members with supervisory skill-set (in addition to accounting expertise) to the financial 
reporting process, which is not documented by Dhaliwal et al. (2010). However, the 
finding is consistent with Goh (2009) which finds that audit committee members with 
supervisory expertise (i.e., expertise gained through experience supervising employees 
with financial reporting responsibilities and overseeing the performance of companies) is 
positively associated with firms’ timeliness in the remediation of internal control 
deficiencies. This could be attributed to these individuals’ know-how and work experience 
as prior (current) CEOs or company presidents and directors of other companies. 
 
         [Insert Table 6 about here] 
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Overlapping of Membership and Financial Reporting Quality 
We further include two dichotomous variables representing overlapping membership 
in audit committee and remuneration committee (OVERLAP) as well as if the overlapping 
member is also an accounting expert (OVERLAP_ACCT) and estimate the equation (2) 
using OLS. The results are presented in Models (1) and (2) of Table 7. Although both the 
estimated coefficients of OVERLAP and OVERLAP_ACCT are positive, they are 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, the findings are not supportive of the fourth 
hypothesis and there is no statistical evidence to suggest that overlapping membership is 
relevant for financial reporting quality in Singapore. Unlike Chandar et al. (2012) which 
find positive impact of overlapping membership and Liao and Hsu (2013) which find the 
opposite, we find that overlapping audit and remuneration committees have no significant 
impact on financial reporting quality. One possible explanation is that high degree of 
committee overlap likely leads to the dilution of efforts because of multi-accountability, 
which might not result in better monitoring of financial reporting process and higher 
financial reporting quality. However, in theory we do agree with Laux and Laux (2009) 
which propose that overlapping membership with the remuneration committee potentially 
results in knowledge spillover that is useful to the audit committee’s financial reporting 
monitoring role. Hence whether or not overlapping of membership has positive impact on 
financial reporting quality in Singapore is still an open question. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Robustness Tests: Effect on Audit Opinion and Firm Performance 
 Our main focus is in examining the relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and effectiveness of monitoring by audit committee members which is 
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measured by financial reporting quality. Effective monitoring by audit committee 
members will result in better corporate governance and eventually better external auditor’s 
opinion and better firm performance. Thus, we conduct two further robustness tests to 
examine the implication of financial reporting quality on external auditor’s opinion and 
firm performance.11 Specifically, we estimate a two-stage regression model, whereby the 
first stage regression is equation (2), with all the three variables (AC_IND; ACCT and 
OVERLAP) representing the audit committee characteristics and other control variables as 
the explanatory variables (results are presented in Model (1) of Table 8). Then, we use the 
predicted value of the financial reporting quality (PFRQ) estimated from the first-stage 
regression as an explanatory variable in the second-stage logistic regression model: 
 
AUDOPi =β0 + β1PRRQi + ∑βk*IndependentVariablesi + ∑βj*ControlVariablesi + εi  (3) 
 
where AUDOP is external auditor’s opinion which equals one if the firm receives unclean 
auditor’s opinion including qualified, no opinion, adverse, or unqualified opinion with 
explanatory language; and 0 otherwise. 
The result of the estimation of equation (3) is presented in Model (2) of Table 8. The 
estimated coefficient of PFRQ is negative (magnitude = -13.141) and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This implies that firms with higher financial reporting quality 
tends to have lower likelihood of receiving qualified opinion, no opinion, adverse opinion 
or unqualified opinion with explanatory language from external auditors. 
 We also employ the predicted value of the financial reporting quality (PFRQ) 
estimated from the first-stage regression as an explanatory variable in the following 
second-stage OLS regression model: 
                                                 
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this suggestion. 
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PERFi = β0 + β1FRQi + ∑βk*IndependentVariablesi + ∑βj*ControlVariablesi + εi      (4) 
 
where PERF is firm performance, measured either in return on assets (ROA) or return on 
equity (ROE). The definition of variables is also reported in Appendix 1. 
Models (3) and (4) of Table 8 display the estimation results of equation (4) when the 
dependent variable is ROA and ROE, respectively. There are strong evidences that higher 
financial reporting quality is associated with higher ROA and ROE, as the estimated 
coefficient of PFRQ is positive and highly significant in both models. 
Therefore, the robustness test results reported in Table 8 suggest that higher financial 
reporting quality will benefit the firm in terms of more clean opinion received from 
external auditors and higher firm performance measured by return on assets or return on 
equity. Hence the effectiveness of audit committees is essential in improving financial 
reporting quality and firm performance. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explores how the three audit committee characteristics (independence, 
expertise, and overlapping membership) influence financial reporting quality for 
Singapore-listed companies in the fiscal year 2010. We find that more than 98 percent of 
the sample firms have audit committees with a majority of independent directors and any 
incremental independence of audit committees has no significant impact on firms’ 
financial reporting quality. Our results cast doubt on the necessity of mandating all audit 
committee members independent like what the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does in the US.  
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The other important finding that we uncover is that while financial reporting quality is 
positively and significantly associated with the presence of accounting expertise in audit 
committee, it is not associated with the presence of finance or supervisory expertise alone 
in audit committee. These findings complement the earlier findings by Dhaliwal et al. 
(2010) for the US firms and signal the benefit and importance of having an audit 
committee member with accounting expertise (rather than finance or supervisory 
expertise) in overseeing the financial reporting process. Additional findings reveal that 
audit committees with accounting expertise only have no significant impact on financial 
reporting quality. Instead, audit committees with mix of accounting, finance and/or 
supervisory expertise enhance financial reporting quality. Although we fail to find any 
relationship between financial reporting quality and overlapping membership in audit and 
remuneration committees (or overlapping independent accounting expert), we strongly 
believe that there should be knowledge spillover resulting from overlapping membership 
that is useful to the audit committee’s financial reporting monitoring role. The costs and 
benefits tradeoff of overlapping membership on financial reporting quality is still an open 
question that we leave for future research. 
The most relevant and notable contribution of this paper is that we find empirical 
evidence which supports calls for a diversity of expertise in audit committees, which is 
consistent with the recommendation in the Guidebook for Audit Committees in Singapore. 
In other words, it is more rewarding for Singapore-listed firms to have audit committees 
that consist not just merely of accounting experts but also those with finance or 
supervisory expertise, so that he/she can provide improved board/audit committee 
monitoring, leading to the firm producing higher quality financial reports. We believe the 
results have policy implications to regulator in Singapore as well as regulators in other 
markets. 
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Appendix 1 Definition of Variables 
 
All variables are calculated based on company’s information in fiscal year 2010, except 
for these explicitly stated in the definition. 
 
Variable name Variable definition 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
FRQ The standard deviation of residuals from cross-sectional regressions of 
equation (1) based on Dechow and Dichev (2002), multiplying by (-1). A 
higher FRQ value indicates higher accruals quality and higher financial 
reporting quality. 
 
Panel B: Independent variables 
AC_IND The proportion of independent audit committee members. 
AC_IND_100 1 if all audit committee members are independent directors and 0 
otherwise. 
ACCT 1 if the audit committee includes at least one accounting expert in and 0 
otherwise. 
FINA 1 if the audit committee includes at least one finance expert in and 0 
otherwise. 
SUPER 1 if the audit committee includes at least one supervisory expert in and 0 
otherwise. 
ACCT_ONLY 1 if the audit committee includes at least one accounting expert but no 
finance or supervisory experts in, and 0 otherwise. 
FINA_ONLY 1 if the audit committee includes at least one finance expert but no 
accounting or supervisory experts in, and 0 otherwise. 
SUPER_ONLY 1 if the audit committee includes at least one supervisory expert but no 
accounting or finance experts in, and 0 otherwise. 
ACCT_FINA 1 if the audit committee includes at least one accounting expert and at 
least one finance expert but no supervisory experts in, and 0 otherwise. 
ACCT_SUPER 1 if the audit committee includes at least one accounting expert and at 
least one supervisory expert but no finance experts in, and 0 otherwise. 
ALL_EXPERT 1 if the audit committee includes at least one accounting expert, at least 
one finance expert, and at least one supervisory expert in, and 0 
otherwise. 
OVERLAP 1 if there is at least one audit committee member sitting on the 
remuneration committee, and 0 otherwise. 
OVERLAP_ACCT 1 if there is at least one independent audit committee member with 
accounting expertise sitting on the remuneration committee, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Panel C: Control variables 
AC_SIZE The number of audit committee members. 
AC_SHARE The proportion of total outstanding shares held by the audit committee 
members. 
AC_MULB The number of boards in which the audit committee members serve. 
AC_TENURE The number of years the audit committee members have served as 
directors of the firm. 
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AC_MEET The number of audit committee meetings held in one year. 
BD_SHARE The proportion of total outstanding shares held by the non-audit 
committee members. 
BD_SIZE The number of non-audit committee members sitting on the board. 
DUALITY 1 if the CEO and board chairman positions are held by the same 
individual and 0 otherwise. 
BIG4 1 if the external auditor is one of the Big Four auditors and 0 otherwise. 
FAMILY 1 if the firm is controlled by a family and 0 otherwise. 
GLC 1 if the firm is a Singapore government-linked company and 0 otherwise. 
SCHIPS 1 if the firm is a Chinese company (S-chips) and 0 otherwise. 
STDCFO Standard deviation of cash flow from operations over the prior five years. 
NEGEARN Proportion of years where firms report losses over the prior five years. 
STDSALES Standard deviation of sales revenue over the prior five years. 
OPCYCLE Natural logarithm of the length of operating cycle measured as the sum 
of average days of account receivable and average days of inventory. 
ASSETS Natural logarithm of the ending total assets. 
INTSALES Ratio of the reported intangibles to total sales revenue. 
INTDUM 1 if INTSALES = 0, and 0 otherwise. 
PPE Ratio of ending net property, plant, and equipment to average total 
assets. 
  
Panel D: Variables used in robustness tests 
AUDOP 1 if auditor gives a qualified opinion, no opinion, adverse opinion or 
unqualified opinion with explanatory language; and 0 otherwise. 
ROA Ratio of profit before interest to average total assets. 
ROE Ratio of net profit to average total shareholders’ equity. 
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TABLE 1 Sample selection 
 
The sample consists of 423 firms listed on Singapore Exchange (SGX) as of 31 December 
2010. 
 
Number of SGX listed companies as of 31 December 2010 782 
Number of companies with financial data available at COMPUSTAT for 
fiscal year 2010 539 
Minus: Companies without 5 years of consecutive financial data for 
computing accruals quality in fiscal year 2010 (101) 
 
Companies with missing values on control variables in fiscal 
year 2010 (15) 
Final sample in fiscal year 2010 423 
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TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for financial reporting quality, audit 
committee characteristics and other variables used in this study. The sample consists of 
423 firms for the fiscal year 2010. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
FRQ -0.107 0.069 -0.419 -0.142 -0.089 -0.055 -0.009 
AC_IND 0.867 0.163 0.500 0.667 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AC_IND_100 0.586 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ACCT 0.799 0.401 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FINA 0.636 0.482 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SUPER 0.967 0.179 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AC_SIZE 3.241 0.532 2.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 6.000 
AC_SHARE 0.009 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.174 
AC_MULTB 1.254 0.954 0.000 0.600 1.000 1.714 8.167 
AC_TENURE 3.030 1.970 0.333 1.600 2.625 4.000 13.750 
AC_MEET 3.764 1.209 0.000 3.000 4.000 4.000 10.000 
BD_IND 0.103 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 1.000 
BD_SHARE 0.064 0.066 0.000 0.014 0.052 0.088 0.395 
DUALITY 0.338 0.474 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BIG4 0.645 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FAMILY 0.362 0.481 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
GLC 0.043 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SCHIPS 0.097 0.296 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ASSETS 5.266 1.580 1.718 4.183 4.961 6.193 10.063 
STDCFO 0.089 0.064 0.007 0.045 0.070 0.113 0.403 
STDSALE 0.249 0.284 0.007 0.092 0.160 0.284 1.744 
NEGEARN 0.203 0.254 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.400 1.000 
OPCYCLE 5.025 0.792 2.769 4.624 5.037 5.416 7.612 
INTSALES 0.087 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.055 1.789 
INTDUM 0.248 0.432 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PPE 0.262 0.211 0.003 0.091 0.218 0.385 0.918 
AUDOP 0.069 0.253 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA 0.031 0.128 -0.750 0.012 0.053 0.092 0.257 
ROE 0.052 0.264 -1.422 0.018 0.094 0.157 0.618 
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TABLE 3 Correlation matrix 
 
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation analysis between financial reporting quality (FRQ) and audit committee characteristics. 
The sample consists of 423 firms for the year 2010. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. * denote statistical significance 
at least at the 10% level. 
 
 
FRQ AC_IND FINA ACCT SUPER AC_SIZE AC_SHARE AC_MULTB AC_TENURE AC_MEET BD_IND BD_SHARE DUALITY 
AC_IND -0.012 1.000 
           FINA -0.051 -0.024 1.000 
          ACCT -0.006 0.003 0.050 1.000 
         SUPER -0.026 -0.023 0.107* -0.027 1.000 
        AC_SIZE 0.024 -0.115* 0.140* 0.106* 0.059 1.000 
       AC_SHARE 0.041 -0.379* -0.042 -0.101* -0.021 -0.004 1.000 
      AC_MULTB 0.107* 0.078 -0.006 0.006 0.0048 0.154* -0.042 1.000 
     AC_TENURE 0.174* -0.163* -0.156* -0.062 -0.017 0.082* 0.332* 0.107* 1.000 
    AC_MEET 0.018 0.110* 0.047 0.034 -0.036 0.177* -0.155* 0.089* -0.009 1.000 
   BD_IND 0.074 -0.017 0.019 0.016 0.002 0.166* -0.041 0.080 -0.060 0.073 1.000 
  BD_SHARE -0.004 0.084* 0.030 0.051 -0.001 -0.175* -0.010 -0.004 0.086* -0.069 -0.197* 1.000 
 DUALITY 0.015 0.087* 0.032 0.009 -0.035 -0.080 -0.012 -0.020 0.083* -0.0836* -0.108* 0.166* 1.000 
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TABLE 4 Audit committee independence and financial reporting quality 
 
This table presents the cross-sectional regression test of financial reporting quality on audit 
committee independence and other control variables. The sample consists of 423 firms for the 
fiscal year 2010. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. p-values are based on 
two-tailed test. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  (1)   (2)   
Independent Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
 Variables Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
AC_IND -0.013 0.448 
  
AC_IND_100 
  
-0.004 0.539 
AC_SIZE -0.010* 0.052 -0.010* 0.050 
AC_SHARE -0.001 0.993 0.004 0.976 
AC_MULTB 0.002 0.570 0.002 0.583 
AC_TENURE 0.001 0.333 0.001 0.327 
AC_MEET -0.000 0.861 -0.000 0.862 
BD_IND 0.012 0.436 0.012 0.428 
BD_SHARE -0.053 0.282 -0.053 0.279 
DUALITY 0.001 0.850 0.001 0.861 
BIG4 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.990 
FAMILY 0.010 0.113 0.010 0.114 
GLC -0.008 0.619 -0.008 0.622 
SCHIPS -0.000 0.976 -0.000 0.987 
ASSETS 0.000 0.851 0.000 0.879 
STDCFO -0.235*** 0.000 -0.235*** 0.000 
STDSALE -0.063*** 0.000 -0.063*** 0.000 
NEGEARN -0.052*** 0.000 -0.052*** 0.000 
OPCYCLE -0.018*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000 
INTSALES 0.021** 0.029 0.021** 0.027 
INTDUM 0.012* 0.052 0.012* 0.052 
PPE 0.064*** 0.000 0.064*** 0.000 
INTERCEPT 0.041 0.241 0.032 0.314 
Adjusted R-Square 0.383 
 
0.379 
 
 
 40 
TABLE 5 Audit committee expertise and financial reporting quality 
 
This table presents the cross-sectional regression tests of financial reporting quality on accounting, finance, and supervisory expertise 
of audit committee, and other control variables. The sample consists of 423 firms for the fiscal year 2010. Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix 1. p-values are based on two-tailed test. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Independent Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
 Variables Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
ACCT 0.017** 0.043 
    
0.016** 0.044 
FINA 
  
-0.002 0.721 
  
-0.002 0.749 
SUPER 
    
-0.015 0.357 -0.014 0.390 
AC_IND -0.012 0.479 -0.013 0.441 -0.014 0.428 -0.017 0.342 
AC_SIZE -0.011** 0.025 -0.009* 0.062 -0.009* 0.057 -0.013** 0.017 
AC_SHARE 0.026 0.820 -0.002 0.988 -0.006 0.961 0.025 0.832 
AC_MULTB 0.002 0.578 0.002 0.572 0.002 0.537 0.002 0.419 
AC_TENURE 0.001 0.336 0.001 0.373 0.001 0.332 0.002 0.253 
AC_MEET -0.001 0.835 -0.000 0.871 -0.001 0.801 -0.001 0.784 
BD_IND 0.012 0.429 0.012 0.440 0.012 0.454 0.010 0.536 
BD_SHARE -0.060 0.238 -0.052 0.296 -0.052 0.293 -0.048 0.358 
DUALITY 0.001 0.854 0.001 0.834 0.001 0.882 0.002 0.761 
BIG4 0.001 0.830 -0.000 0.976 0.000 0.995 0.000 0.949 
FAMILY 0.010 0.130 0.010 0.114 0.010 0.120 0.009 0.186 
GLC -0.010 0.497 -0.007 0.632 -0.007 0.639 -0.011 0.457 
SCHIPS -0.000 0.998 -0.000 0.988 -0.000 0.994 0.002 0.831 
ASSETS 0.000 0.857 0.000 0.837 0.000 0.838 -0.000 0.891 
STDCFO -0.234*** 0.000 -0.235*** 0.000 -0.231*** 0.000 -0.226*** 0.000 
STDSALE -0.065*** 0.000 -0.063*** 0.000 -0.063*** 0.000 -0.064*** 0.000 
NEGEARN -0.053*** 0.000 -0.052*** 0.000 -0.052*** 0.000 -0.052*** 0.000 
OPCYCLE -0.019*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000 
INTSALES 0.023** 0.024 0.021** 0.030 0.022** 0.024 0.023** 0.024 
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INTDUM 0.014** 0.034 0.013** 0.049 0.012* 0.052 0.014** 0.029 
PPE 0.065*** 0.000 0.063*** 0.000 0.065*** 0.000 0.067*** 0.000 
INTERCEPT 0.036 0.298 0.042 0.230 0.054 0.146 0.046 0.228 
Adjusted 
R-Square 
0.392 
 
0.383 
 
0.384 
 
0.395 
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TABLE 6 Audit committee mixed expertise and financial reporting quality 
 
This table presents the cross-sectional regression tests of financial reporting quality on mix of 
expertise in audit committees and other control variables. The sample consists of 423 firms 
for the fiscal year 2010. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. p-values are based 
on two-tailed test. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  
   
 
  (1)  
 
 
Independent Coefficient 
  
 
Variables Estimate p-value 
 
 
ACCT_ONLY 0.020 0.413 
 
 
ACCT_FINA 0.043*** 0.000 
 
 
ACCT_SUPER 0.018* 0.055 
 
 
ALL_EXPERT 0.015* 0.081 
 
 
AC_IND -0.013 0.466 
 
 
AC_SIZE -0.011** 0.033 
 
 
AC_SHARE 0.021 0.858 
 
 
AC_MULTB 0.002 0.554 
 
 
AC_TENURE 0.001 0.338 
 
 
AC_MEET -0.001 0.757 
 
 
BD_IND 0.013 0.415 
 
 
BD_SHARE -0.057 0.266 
 
 
DUALITY 0.001 0.863 
 
 
BIG4 0.001 0.906 
 FAMILY 0.010 0.136 
 GLC -0.010 0.510  
 SCHIPS 0.000 0.999  
 
ASSETS 0.001 0.802 
 
 
STDCFO -0.233*** 0.000 
 
 
STDSALE -0.065*** 0.000 
 
 
NEGEARN -0.053*** 0.000 
 
 
OPCYCLE -0.019*** 0.000 
 
 
INTSALES 0.023** 0.022 
 
 
INTDUM 0.014** 0.040 
 
 
PPE 0.066*** 0.000 
 
 
INTERCEPT 0.036 0.304 
 
 
Adjusted R-Square 0.393   
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TABLE 7 Overlapping membership and financial reporting quality 
 
This table presents the cross-sectional regression test of financial reporting quality on 
overlapping membership on audit committee and remuneration committee, accounting 
expertise and other control variables. The sample consists of 423 firms for the fiscal year 
2010. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. p-values are based on two-tailed test. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1)   (2)   
Independent Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
 Variables Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
OVERLAP -0.002 0.923   
OVERLAP_ACCT   0.005 0.417 
AC_IND -0.013 0.452 -0.015 0.402 
AC_SIZE -0.010* 0.058 -0.010* 0.050 
AC_SHARE -0.003 0.977 0.003 0.980 
AC_MULTB 0.002 0.571 0.002 0.578 
AC_TENURE 0.001 0.332 0.001 0.337 
AC_MEET -0.000 0.861 -0.000 0.856 
BD_IND 0.012 0.443 0.013 0.391 
BD_SHARE -0.053 0.282 -0.054 0.279 
DUALITY 0.001 0.852 0.001 0.863 
BIG4 -0.000 0.996 0.001 0.916 
FAMILY 0.010 0.113 0.010 0.116 
GLC -0.008 0.621 -0.007 0.633 
SCHIPS -0.000 0.976 -0.000 0.969 
ASSETS 0.000 0.848 0.001 0.823 
STDCFO -0.235*** 0.000 -0.234*** 0.000 
STDSALE -0.063*** 0.000 -0.064*** 0.000 
NEGEARN -0.052*** 0.000 -0.052*** 0.000 
OPCYCLE -0.018*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000 
INTSALES 0.021** 0.029 0.021** 0.028 
INTDUM 0.012* 0.053 0.013** 0.049 
PPE 0.064*** 0.000 0.064*** 0.000 
INTERCEPT 0.042 0.275 0.040 0.252 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.383   0.384   
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TABLE 8 Effect on Auditor’s Opinion and Firm Performance 
 
This table presents the cross-sectional regression tests of external auditor’s opinion and firm performance on predicted financial 
reporting quality and other control variables. PFRQ is the predicted value from the regression of FRQ on audit committee 
characteristics (AC_IND; ACCT and OVERLAP) and other control variables (the first stage regression which is reported in Model 
(1) in this table). The dependent variables in the second stage regressions are AUDOP in Model (2), ROA in Model (3), and ROE 
in Model (4); respectively. The sample consists of 423 firms for the fiscal year 2010. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix 1. p-values are based on two-tailed test. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 First Stage Second Stage 
Dependent 
Variables 
 
FRQ 
 
AUDOP  ROA  ROE  
  (1)  (2)   (3)   (4)   
Independent Coefficient  Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
 
Coefficient  
Variables Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
ACCT 0.017** 0.041       
AC_IND -0.012 0.491       
OVERLAP -0.005 0.805       
PFRQ   -13.141*** 0.000 0.657*** 0.000 0.927*** 0.003 
AC_SIZE -0.011** 0.030 -0.193 0.724 0.023** 0.025 0.021 0.363 
AC_SHARE 0.021 0.853 4.605 0.617 0.100 0.640 0.348 0.395 
AC_MULTB 0.002 0.580 -0.487 0.131 -0.008 0.124 -0.025* 0.090 
AC_TENURE 0.001 0.333 -0.170* 0.066 0.003 0.364 0.003 0.570 
AC_MEET -0.001 0.834 0.069 0.670 -0.004 0.376 -0.001 0.917 
BD_IND 0.012 0.447 -0.062 0.955 -0.027 0.504 0.065 0.342 
BD_SHARE -0.060 0.235 1.027 0.759 0.092 0.329 0.009 0.962 
DUALITY 0.001 0.859 0.219 0.614 0.004 0.731 0.039 0.145 
BIG4 0.001 0.850 -0.301 0.503 0.002 0.884 0.039 0.178 
FAMILY 0.010 0.131 -0.072 0.893 0.010 0.407 0.034 0.171 
ASSETS 0.000 0.850 -0.136 0.447 0.020*** 0.000 0.035*** 0.002 
INTERCEPT 0.040 0.294 -2.214 0.274 -0.071* 0.095 -0.135 0.143 
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Pseudo or Adjusted 
R-Squared 
 
0.392  0.133  0.148  0.121  
         
 
 
